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ABSTRACT 
 
The level of US intra-firm imports from Emerging Markets, EM, (i.e., imports of 
MNEs from their foreign affiliates) has increased from 149 billion USD in 2002 to 
347 billion USD in 2012. A similar magnitude is observed for US arm’s length 
imports (i.e., imports of MNEs from third parties in foreign countries). This thesis 
estimates the responsiveness of US intra-firm and arm’s length imports to 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection indicators, “Doing Business” 
indicators, and to the Global Recession. I use two panel data sets, one covering 
332 industries (3-digit NAICS) and 43 emerging countries from 2002 to 2012, the 
other covering 10 industries (2-digit NAICS) and 190 countries over the same time 
period. My regressions control for fixed country, industry, and time effects. I find 
that the levels of both intra-firm trade and arm’s length trade increase substantially 
in response to stronger IPRs.  I also find that the share of intra-firm imports in 
total imports increases due to stronger IPRs, a result which suggests that firms 
increase their intra-firm activities by more than their arm’s length activities. 
During the Great Recession, the share of intra-firm imports to Emerging Markets 
increases by 1.1 %. This implies that the decline in intra-firm imports is smaller 
than the decline in either arm’s length trade or total intra-firm trade, a result which 
shows the relative resilience of intra-firm trade to fluctuations in global output. 
Finally, “Doing Business” indicators, including “Enforcing Contracts”, do not 
have significant effects on the share of intra-firm imports.  
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Chapter 1|Introduction 
A new notion of international trade - Global Value Chains (GVC) is coined in the 
1990s to describe the method of fragmentizing production process among different 
locations across the globe. Due to the fast decreasing cost of transportation and 
communication means, GVC has become a popular method for Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs) to utilize comparative advantages of different countries in producing goods and 
services. A labor-abundant country, for example, offers an ideal location for MNEs to 
transfer the labor-intensive part of the production process over. Offshoring production 
assists MNEs in reducing costs and increasing efficiency. At the same time, host 
countries of MNE’s production process benefit via knowledge spillovers and an increase 
in their exports. Recently, the surge in trade between developing and developed countries 
implies the growing importance of GVC in the international economy system.  
Global Value Chains, however, can increase the vulnerability of trade system 
under the influence of negative shocks. During the global recession 2009, for example, 
drop in trade was “severe, sudden, and synchronized,1” at the rate of 13%, six times 
higher than decline in world GDP in 2009 (-2.2%). Many economists believe that the 
interdependence among trade partners, thanks to GVC, propelled a transmission 
mechanism that made the crisis spread more quickly and its damage more severe. The 
impact of the transmission mechanism is apparent by observing the trade decline of 
related industry sectors in the same supply chain. For example, a reduction in U.S. 
                                                        1 See Baldwin (2009) 
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exports of semiconductors and components to developing countries is closely linked to 
the drop in US imports of computers and cell phones. The reason is that cellphone- 
assembly plants around the world, mostly concentrated in China and Southeast Asia, 
depend on intermediate goods manufactured in United States. Similarly, when exports 
decline in Japan as a result of the decreasing demand from US, the market of intermediate 
goods in China would suffer decline in sales.  
 In short, the integrated and interdependent world economy is both a blessing and a 
curse to MNEs.  On the one hand, MNEs benefit from the vertical specialization of 
production, including cost reduction and access to host countries’ resources. Moreover, as 
nearly 90% of sales from foreign affiliates happen in host country market or other foreign 
markets2, investment in EMs opens the door to multiple potential markets around the 
globe. On the other hand, it can come with a lot of risks regarding both the political, 
social, and cultural differences and the interdependence between MNEs and their trade 
partners. Finding a way to either avoid or minimize the risk, especially when a negative 
macroeconomic shock occurs, is a top priority for MNEs. In order to achieve that, MNEs 
have to make the right choice of entry modes into host countries, either through intra-firm 
trade (greenfield investment, mergers and acquisitions) or arm’s length trade 
(subcontracting, licensing, etc.).  
 Intra-firm trade (IFT) is the flow of exchanges in goods and services within the 
boundaries of multinational enterprises; between theirs headquarters and foreign affiliates 
or related parties located in different countries. In 2004, IF imports and exports accounts 
                                                        2 See Slaughter and Matthew (2010) 
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for 53% and 33% respectively of total US imports and exports3. An example of IFT is 
when a wholly owned subsidiary of Intel ships back to the US headquarter a component 
of its microchips that has been produced in the host country of the subsidiary. Arm’s 
length trade (ALT) is when MNEs subcontract part of their production process to foreign 
manufacturers or directly purchase from them. Licensing and subcontracting are the most 
common ALT arrangements. For example, Nike subcontracts most of its shoe and apparel 
manufacturing process to independent producers in Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam.  
IFT has been a large portion of total trade, though its value varies greatly among 
industries, countries, and MNEs. Most notably, IFT from developed to developing 
countries have been increasing significantly, especially after the global recession 2009. 
According to data of financial and operating expenses of U.S. BEA, total sales, assets, 
and employments of U.S. MNE’s foreign affiliates in emerging markets are on an upward 
trend, compared to the stagnating data of foreign affiliates in developed countries. Data 
of US Census on Related-Parties4 Trade also shows a similar pattern. Figure 1 shows the 
trend of share of IFT imports/exports out of total imports/exports for the last 10 years. 
The graph on the left compares IFT imports of All Countries to that of exclusively EMs. 
Similarly, the right one is comparison of IFT exports. These two graphs show the 
increasing pattern of both share of IFT imports and exports to EMs. Especially, the share 
                                                        3 See data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 4 Regarding terminologies, IFT and related parties trade can be exchangeable even though there are some 
minor differences due to data collection methods of BEA and US Census. In the export data, both 
institutions use the same definition of a related party in the Census data and an IFT in the BEA (the 
balance-of-payments threshold for FDI of a 10% ownership stake). In the import data, the BEA definition 
of an IFT stays the same, but the Census definition of related parties is broader, including both transactions 
of IF and AF4. In this paper, related-parties is exchangeable with IFT. 
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of IFT exports to EMs is on a significant increasing trend. To the contrary, the share of IF 
imports and exports to all countries are fairly stagnant.  
 
  
Figure 1: Share of Total IFT (%) to All Countries and IFT to Emerging Countries 
(Source: US NAICS Bureau) 
More interestingly, the data shows that IFT seems to be more resilient to 
macroeconomic shocks than ALT. Figure 2 demonstrates the responsiveness of IFT 
imports during the recession 2009. During the global crisis in 2008, the IFT imports to 
EMs declined by 14.3%, compared to 24% drop in the IFT imports to all countries. In 
2009, IFT imports to EMs rebounded strongly to an increase in 27.7%, while the IFT 
imports to all countries went up by 24.5%.Figure 3 shows the percentage decrease of total 
imports, ALT, and IFT imports for three groups of countries: all countries, OECD 
countries, and five emerging countries. While the difference of the all countries group is 
not very huge – a decline of 26.8% in ALT imports compared to 24.1% of IFT imports 
during 2009, data of the emerging countries group shows a wide discrepancy. IFT 
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imports from US’ MNEs to EMs dropped by the lowest percentage (-9.2%) compared to 
ALT imports to EMs (-17.5%) or IFT to other countries groups (around-23%). 
 
Figure 2: Year-to-Year Changes in IF Imports of All Countries and That of EMs 
(Source: US Census Bureau, Related Party Database) 
 
 
Figure 3: Percentage Changes in US Total Imports, IF, and AL Import in 2009 
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(5Source: US Census Bureau, Related Party Database) 
 
  An important paper of Bernard et al. (2009b) finds the same pattern during the 
Asian financial crisis 1997 when IFT seems to be much less vulnerable than ALT. What 
are the reasons behind this phenomenon? The bullwhip effect, a notion coined by Forester 
(1961), describes a phenomenon of inventories’ adjustment within supply chains. To 
guarantee that the quantity of products meet demands, up-stream foreign suppliers have 
to store a big amount of inventories. When global recession hits, these suppliers have to 
suddenly halt production while their huge stocks of inventories remain static. The 
bullwhip effect magnifies the disastrous impact of the global recession on trade. The 
vertical integration of production process through IFT reduces the uncertainty of demand. 
As the estimation of sales along the supply chains within firms’ boundaries will be more 
predictable, foreign affiliates do not to deal with large inventories. Moreover, the 
information exchange between headquarters and foreign affiliates in IFT is faster and 
smoother, leading to a better management of inventories in the presence of IFT than 
ALT. Last but not least, IFT imports between MNEs and EMs is of smaller share (around 
30% of total IFT as presented in Figure 1) and of lower values than IFT to developed 
countries. Thus, a negative shock would not affect them as hard compared to other trade 
types. 
  Yet, how much did IFT from U.S. MNEs to EMs actually decline during the 
global recession 2009? Is it significantly lower than other types of trade or merely enough 
due to its small portion in the total IFT? Not many studies have been focused exclusively 
on the IFT to EMs and its responsiveness during the global crisis 2009. Moreover, due to                                                         5 The EE5 Counties are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa  
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the current shift in production and consumption from the North the fast growing 
emerging economies, it is crucial to understand in-depth the management decision of 
MNEs to invest in EMs and how trade policies and conditions in different EMs affect the 
IFT. Thus, the study contributes to and enhances the body of literature by assessing the 
impact of the global recession and Intellectual Property Rights on IFT of US’ MNEs to 
EMs.  
  My methodology is to regress IFT and ALT levels on the commonly used IPR 
index developed by Ginarte and Park, Recession Dummy and doing business indicators 
as developed by the World Bank. I use two panel data sets, one covering 332 industries 
(3-digit NAICS) and 43 emerging countries from 2002 to 2012, the other covering 10 
industries (2-digit NAICS) and 190 countries over the same time period. My regressions 
control for fixed country, industry, and time effects. I find that the levels of both intra-
firm trade and arm’s length trade increase substantially in response to stronger IPRs.  I 
also find that the share of intra-firm imports in total imports increases due to stronger 
IPRs, a result which suggests that firms increase their intra-firm activities by more than 
their arm’s length activities. During the Great Recession, the share of intra-firm imports 
to Emerging Markets increases by 1.1 %. This implies that the decline in intra-firm 
imports is smaller than the decline in either arm’s length trade or total intra-firm trade, a 
result which shows the relative resilience of intra-firm trade to fluctuations in global 
output. Finally, “Doing Business” indicators, including “Enforcing Contracts”, do not 
have significant effects on the share of intra-firm imports.  
  The rise in the levels of IFT and ALT activity is in line with the predictions of the 
theoretical literature. However, the increased share of IFT in overall Multinational 
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activity contradicts the findings of Kamal Saggi (1997), Helpman (1992), and Yang and 
Maskus (2009). My results suggest that increased IPRs as measured by the Ginarte and 
Park index simply do not provide the additional protection for firms to expand their 
activities beyond their own boundaries.  
In Chapter 2, I define the concept of IFT and present a brief overview of the 
growing theoretical literature on IFT and its determinants. I will present a brief analysis 
of how these determinants affect IFT from US’MNEs to specifically EMs and outline 
couple of empirical studies that have investigated the reaction of Global Value Chain, in 
general and IFT, in particular to macroeconomic shocks. Finally, I review their 
methodologies and what I can apply to this study.  
In Chapter 3, I set up the econometric model. I explain the choice of data and 
describe the framework used to measure the responsiveness. I also give a brief overview 
of Doing Business variables that link to the determinants of IFT and explain the rationale 
for the sample period and variables used in the model. 
In Chapter 4, I explain the results of the regression estimation. I present the 
rationale of each coefficient in all regressions and whether it reconfirms findings of other 
research papers and how the result can contribute to the existing literature. Finally, I 
conclude my study in Chapter 5 with the significance of the result, its implication on 
trade policies, and recommendations on further investigation of the topic. 
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Chapter 2|Literature Review 
2.1. Determinants of Intra-Firm trade (IFT) 
Both empirical and theoretical literature on the determinants of IFT have been 
growing fast during the last decade. In terms of the theoretical foundation, economists 
have investigated the firm-level choice of organizations between internalizing the 
production process (IFT) and subcontracting to outside manufacturers (ALT). However 
as the data of intra-firm trade on a firm level is scarce and incomplete, most of the 
empirical literature of IFT looks into determinants on the country and industry level.  
Dunning (1977, 1981) created the OLT framework to explain the incentives of 
MNEs to opt for IFT when entering a foreign country. They are: 
1) Ownership Advantage: IFT allows MNEs to protect their technology 
(patents, blue prints) and even trade secret internally.  
2) Location Advantage: It is more profitable to produce in a certain country 
due to its endowments of labor and natural resources.  
3) Internalization Advantage: the production process is exploited internally 
within the firm, thus, preventing competitions.  
Moreover, there is a wide variation of intra-firm trade across countries and 
industries. Industry characteristics that have positive links to intra-firm trade are product 
complexity, contractility, R&D intensity, and productivity dispersion. Country 
characteristics includes those from the gravity models such as GDP, distance, exchange 
rates and others including labor skills, the ease of doing business, and intellectual 
property rights (IPR). While my study focuses on country-level determinants, the 
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following subsection will give an overview of literature reviews on some of the most 
important determinants of IFT. They are product contractibility, IPR, Productivity 
Dispersion and R&D intensity.  
2.1.1. Product Cycle and Product Contractibility  
Antras (2003) provides a model of how the product cycle hypothesis and the 
product contractibility influence firms’ decision on choosing AL or IFT. According to 
Raymond Vernon, who first described the product cycle, firms produce novice products 
first in the North. When the process is standardized, firms have incentives to shift the 
production process to the South due to lower wages. The decision of choosing either IFT 
or ALT, Vernon argued, depends on the degree of standardization of the technology. 
Antras expanded the product cycle argument by showing that the voluntary 
transferring process outside MNEs’ boundaries can happen even with new, 
unstandardized products. However, the incomplete nature of contracts prevents firms to 
do so.  
“Contracts are incomplete because neither the quality of the intermediate 
input nor the amount of investments in capital and labor can be verified by a third 
party and contracts cannot be written on sales revenues. The only contractible are 
therefore the allocation of residual rights of control and an ex ante transfer 
between the final goods suppliers and intermediate input producers.”  (Antras, 
2003) 
 
Incomplete contracts of ALT can generate the hold-up problem as Southern 
independent subcontractor may not act upon agreements. When fears of the hold-up 
problem outweighs the benefit of low labor costs, firms have more incentives to either 
produce unstandardized goods in the North or in case of offshoring, transfer the 
production process internally (IFT). The incomplete contracts also explain why IFT is 
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more concentrated among developed countries where “ suboptimal relationship-specific 
investment” between headquarters and foreign affiliates is easier to establish. Antras also 
asserted that the improvement in the contracting environment in international transaction 
increases investment of MNEs in the developing countries.  
2.1.2. Intellectual Property Rights 
 
An empirical study by Corcos et al. (2009), using a data set of French import 
transaction at film, country, and product levels in 1999, investigates IFT and its relations 
with intellectual property rights (IPR). These authors suggest that IPR plays an important 
role in firms’ choice between IFT and ALT. Especially, when firms’ products are 
complex and resulted from costly R&D, MNEs are much more careful with the protection 
of their intangible assets when placing them in a foreign country. They would choose 
either to internalize the production process (IFT) in order to “reduces the dissipation of 
intangible assets” or to subcontract (ALT) in a country that heavily enforces IPR to 
prevent imitation. (Corcos et al, 2009). Their result corresponds with Naghavi et 
al.(2013) who analyzed a dataset of French firm-level survey in order to investigate the 
influence  of IPR protection on MNEs’ mode of entry in a foreign countries. 
Kamal Saggi (1997) also contribute to the IPR literature by conducting a survey 
on IFT and international technology transfer. 
“If [local partners via ALT ] can get access to the multinational’s 
proprietary knowledge, the value of such knowledge can be dissipated either 
because of increased competition (Ethier and Markusen, 1991, Markusen, 1999, 
and Saggi, 1996 and 1999) or because the local partner has inadequate incentives 
to protect the multinational’s reputation (Horstmann and Markusen, 1987). The 
incentive to prevent the dissipation of knowledge-based assets is reflected in the 
fact that multinationals transfer technologies of new vintage via direct investment, 
preferring to license or transfer their older technologies via joint ventures (see 
Mansfiled and Romeo, 1980).” 
17 
 
While Yang and Maskus (2009), and Helpman (1992) study the effects of Southern IPR 
enforcement on the Northern firm behavior reaches the same conclusion with previous 
studies, they also found that multinationals are less likely to set up manufacturing and 
R&D facilities in countries with IPR regimes and more likely to set up sales and 
marketing ventures, since the later run no risk of technology linkage. 
2.1.3. Productivity Dispersion and R&D Intensity 
As discussed above, IFT varies widely across not only countries, but also 
industries. There have been some empirical studies to test determinants of IFT that are 
based on firms and industry characteristics. Antras and Helpman (2004) expanded their 
analysis by considering firm heterogeneity and found out that the dispersion of firm 
productivity is positively associated with an increase in the share of IF imports out of US 
imports. The research of Nunn and Trefler (2008) examines this relationship empirically 
with the US data on IF and AL imports for 5,323 products in 210 countries. Their result 
confirms that the IFT is largest with the highest level of both products’ complexity and 
MNEs’ productivity. Figure 4 shows the percentage of intra-firm imports out of total 
imports in all 3-digit NAICS industry sectors. It is apparent that high-tech industries such 
as transportation equipment, computer, and machines have higher ratios of IFT than low-
tech industries such as materials, textiles. 
18 
 
Figure 3.1: IFT ratios of 3-digit NAICS code industries 
 
Another empirical study of Yeaple (2006) supports the theoretical model. Using 
data from the 1994 Benchmark Survey of Bureau of Economic Analysis, Yeaple tested 
the impact of productivity dispersion6, capital-labor ratio, R&D intensity to sale on the 
share of IFT and its variation among three groups of countries: least developed, 
emerging/newly developed, and developed. The study shows the positive relationship of 
all these above independent variables on the IFT. However, while productivity dispersion 
has a statistically significant impact on IFT shares in only developed countries, the 
                                                        6 Productivity Dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of the logarithm of firm sales across firms 
within an industry. According to Antras and Helpman (2004) differences in firm size as measured by final 
good sales reflect differences in productivity because more productive firms sell more. 
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coefficients of capital-labor ratio and R&D intensity are positive and significant for 
emerging/ newly developed economies.  
In sum, Table 2.1 below summarizes the determinants that influence MNEs’ 
choice of establishing their own production facilities abroad (IFT) instead of 
subcontracting or licensing (ALT).  
2.2. Global Value Chains and Trade Crisis 
  Surprisingly, only a few studies have focused on the responsiveness of IFT to 
macroeconomic shocks so far. In fact, most of the literature looked into the role of Global 
Value Chains in the trade crisis 2009. The most notable paper is by Bernard (2009b), 
which used data from US Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database to 
investigate how trade reacted to the Asian financial crisis 1997. His method of difference-
in- difference approach compares the treatment group of crisis countries (Thailand, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines) to a control group of all other countries before 
and after July 1997. The paper concluded that IFT is indeed more resilient than ALT 
during the crisis. US arm’s length trade declined 26% between 1996-1998 while intra 
firm trade exports declined by only 4%. “The extensive margin, the number of exporting 
firms fell by 16% for ALT and by 7% for IFT while the intensive margin, the 
development in trade due to surviving firms fell by 8% for arms length exports and by 
9% for IF exports.” (Bernard et al. 2009b)  
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Table 2.1: Determinants of IFT and Their Expected Signs 
 
Level Determinants of IFT Explanation Expected 
Sign  
Expected 
Sign 
 
 
Firm  
R& D Intensity Ratio of expenditures on R&D 
over sales of MNEs 
 
+ + 
Capital Intensity Ratio of assets per employee 
of MNEs 
 
+ + 
The intensity of 
international 
production 
Ratio of total asset of FA/total 
asset of parents 
- - 
 
 
Industry  
 
Products’ Complexity 
The Inputs-Outputs Matrix 
Table 
 
+ + 
 
Productivity 
Dispersion 
Standard Deviation of the 
logarithm of firm sales across 
firms within an industry 
 
+ + 
 
 
 
 
Country  
GDP/ GDP per 
capital 
In current USD 
 
+ + 
Exchange Rate  Effective, against current USD + + 
IPR Index The measurement of how 
countries comply with the law 
of Intellectual Protection 
Right  
 
+ - 
Strength of Investor 
Protection 
The average of measurements 
on the extent of disclosure the 
extent of director liability 
index, and the ease of 
shareholder suits index. 
 
+ - 
Total Taxes  Taxes as % of Profit 
 
- - 
Costs of Trade  In current USD 
 
- - 
Product 
Contractibility 
How likely subcontractors in 
foreign countries will act upon 
agreement.  
+ - 
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  Another paper looks broadly into the role of Global Value Chains in the global 
recession 2009 through the dataset of French firms’ transactions7, concluding that IFT 
reacts more intensely than ALT. During 2009, it has a “faster drop followed by a faster 
recovery.” The paper attributes this responsiveness to the ability of MNEs to adjust 
inventories more quickly and efficient due to “the synchronized circulation of 
information and the ensuing optimal management of stocks within the boundaries of the 
groups.” (Altamonte et al. 2012)   
2.3. IFT inflow to emerging markets during the financial crisis   
  To assess the responsiveness of IFT, it is also important to look into the reaction 
of the IFT inflow of emerging economies to the global recession. During the first half of 
2008, where the crisis started affecting developed countries severely, emerging 
economies actually received an increase in IFT inflows at a slower pace than previous 
year. As the global crisis prolonged, liquidity constraints made MNEs to significantly 
tighten their investment abroad. More importantly, “the resilience of  [IFT] inflows to 
emerging economies after their crises [for example, Asia in 1997 and Latin America in 
2000] is in marked contrast to the grim IFT developments in 2009, where M&A deals and 
Greenfield investments declined in most emerging markets- despite the equally open 
investment policy environment.” 8 (Poulsen and Hufbauer, 2011) Moreover, although 
slowly beginning to rise again in 2010, inflows to emerging markets remained more than 
20% below their 2008 level. The paper also compared the level of IF debt and equity                                                         7 62 million of transaction by 167,833 exporting and importing firms located in France in the period of 
2007-2009, including 5754 headquarters of MNEs connecting through the proprietary linkages of 690,501 
co affiliates worldwide  
8 See Poulsen and Hufbauer (2011), Foreign Direct Investment in Times of Crisis, 
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investment that shows the MNEs’ long-term strategic commitment in emerging market. 
In 2009, according to World Bank (2009, p.52), while the flow of debt from US parents 
to foreign affiliates reduced to a much extent (similar to past crises), the equity 
investment declined substantially (in contrast to past crises). As IFT accounts for almost 
half of trade from MNEs to EMs, this phenomenon explains why recovery of IFT in the 
global recession 2009 was much slower than the Asian crisis 1997 or other past crises. 
Another reason for slower growth of emerging market is due to the ability of foreign 
affiliates to monitor their destinations of sales under the influence of macroeconomic 
shock. Being part of MNEs’ networks allows foreign affiliates to switch from domestic 
sales to exports if crisis hit the host country. During the Asian crisis, IF exports from 
emerging markets to US increased as foreign affiliates shipped most of products back to 
the MNEs’ headquarters. 9However, the widespread of the global recession 2009 
prevented the foreign affiliates to do the same thing. Thus, IFT in EMs during 2009 
would not be as resilient to the macroeconomic as what Bernard et al. (2009b) found in 
Asian crisis 1997. Yet, in the overall comparison to developed economies, EMs with 
smaller initial vulnerabilities was affected by the recession later and exited earlier, also 
experienced considerably smaller declines in output during the global recession 2009.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                         9 See UNCTAD, The Financial Crisis in Asia and Foreign Direct Investment: An Assessment 
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Chapter 3|Data Description and Model 
 Following the extensive literature in Chapter 2, I will test the 
responsiveness of IFT to the global recession and its relationships with country-level 
determinants such as Paying Taxes, Trade Across Borders, and Enforcing Contracts 
indexes and the IPR indexes constructed by Walter Parker. The study analyzes a panel 
dataset that covers trade data of all 3-digit NAICS industries from US to all countries 
during the period 2002-2012. This sector will give an overview of the data description.  
3.1. Dependent Variable 
For my dependent variable, I use the panel data of US Census Bureau, which is 
comprised of the values of intra-firm imports and total imports of all industries from US 
to 103 countries over the period 2002-2012. Related-parties imports are defined as import 
transactions between parties “[that] are directly or indirectly, owning, controlling or 
holding power to vote, 6 percent of the outstanding voting stock or shares of any 
organizations”.10 The dependent variables take forms of both the value of intra-firm 
imports and the share of intra-firm imports out of total imports on independent variables. 
Thus, the results of these regressions will shed light on the responsiveness of intra-firm 
imports in terms of both the level and the share.  
 
 
 
                                                         
10 See http://sasweb.ssd.census.gov/relatedparty/relatedhelp.html#variables 
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3.2. Independent Variables 
3.2.1. Dummy Variable  
I create a dummy variable to capture recession years. The Recession Dummy 
(REC) takes the value of 1 for recession years (2008 and 2009) and 0 for the rest of the 
period (2002 - 2012).  
3.2.2. IPR index  
I gather the Intellectual Property Right (IPR) index constructed by Walter Park. 
The index is measured based on five criteria: the coverage of patentable inventions, 
memberships in international treaties, duration of protection, enforcement mechanisms, 
and restrictions.11 Because the IPR data set comprises of index for only every 5 years, I 
have to reproduce data of 2000 for 2002 and 2003, data of 2005 for 2004, 2006, 2007, 
and the rest from data of 2010. My assumption is that IPR index of a certain year will 
have lagging effect on the time period after or before the year benchmark, within the 
variation of +/- 2 years. However, it should be noted that this method may undermine the 
persistency of the regression model.  
3.2.3. Doing Business Variables 
There are four variables from the Doing Business website that I focus on. They 
are Strength of Investor Protection Index, Trading Across Border, Paying Taxes, and 
Enforcing Contracts.  
1. The Strength of Investor Protection Index ranges from 0-10 with the 
higher value indicating more investor protection. The index is the 
average of measurements on the extent of disclosure (how a corporate                                                         
11 See Park Walter (2008) 
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body processes and discloses information of transactions), the extent of 
director liability index (how much liability directors have), and the ease 
of shareholder suits index (how much power shareholders have to 
challenge the transaction).  
2. The Trading Across Border variable is measured as the Cost of 
importing a 20-foot container in current USD.  Cost of Imports is 
comprised of all the fees associated with the procedures to import the 
goods, such as costs for documents, administrative fees for customs 
clearance and inspections, customs broker fees, port-related charges and 
inland transport costs. (No customs tariffs and duties or costs related to 
sea transport are recorded.) 
3. The Paying Taxes variable is measured by the ratio of total tax out of 
EBIT12. The measurement includes all different taxes and payable 
contributions, such as profit or corporate income tax, social 
contributions and labor taxes, property taxes, turnover taxes and other 
taxes (municipal fees and vehicle taxes).   
4. The Enforcing Contract variable is measured by the total cost as the 
percentage of claim; the total cost includes court costs, enforcement 
costs, and average attorney fees. 
 Based on the literature discussed in the previous chapter, these Doing Business 
variables demonstrate factors that will influence the trade volume and the choice of Intra-
Firm Trade (IFT) and Arm’s Length Trade (ALT) to some extent. The higher the                                                         
12 EBIT stands for Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
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Strength of Investor Protection in a country, the higher the value of trade inflow will be. 
Thus, the variable is positively linked to the values of intra-firm import. The Cost of 
Import and Total Taxes Rate, on the other hand, are expected to have a negative 
relationship with the flow of trade to a country. According to Antras and Helpman 
(2004), Enforcing Contract is negatively linked to the value of intra-firm trade. If the total 
cost as percentage of claim is high, related parties are more likely to follow the contract. 
Given the other factors unchanged, MNEs, thus, will be more inclined to subcontract 
their production process (ALT) instead of choosing IFT when Enforcing Contract 
increases. In figure 5, I plot the Enforcing Contracts data of EMs on a scatter plot against 
each country’s share of IFT imports. The data do not show any clear correlation between 
two variables. 
 
Figure 5: Relationship between Share of IFT imports out of Total Imports 
and Enforcing Contracts of EMs Dataset 
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 One problem with the Doing Business dataset is the time frame 2004-2014. To 
merge it with the rest of the dataset, which has the time frame 2002-2012, I have to move 
back each year of Doing Business variables into two years earlier. For example, data of 
Doing Business variables in 2004 will become that of 2002. Correspondingly, the data of 
2005 is changed into that of 2003 and so forth. My assumption is that data from the 
Doing Business survey is more likely to have a lagging impact on IFT and ALT. It is also 
important to note that the dataset does not show a lot of variation of these indexes of each 
country over time. 
3.2.4. Country Characteristics Variables 
To control for country characteristics, I gather data of GDP, GDP per capita, 
effective exchange rate13, and inflation from the World Bank Database. Higher values of 
real exchange rate imply an appreciated dollar relative to the local currency, increasing 
the likelihood of import by the US industry. Thus, we expect a positive sign for the real 
exchange rate’s coefficient. Table 3.1 below summarizes all the variables, their 
definition, unit measurement, and sources.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         13 Please refer to the Appendix for the calculation of Real Exchange Rate 
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Table 3.1: All Variables of Regression 
 
Variables Names Explanation of Unit Source 
Intra-Firm 
Imports 
The value in USD 
The ratio of IFT imports out of total imports 
 
US Census Bureau 
IPR IPR index 
 
Walker Park 
GDP, GDP per 
capital 
In current USD 
 
World Bank 
Database 
Real Exchange 
Rate 
Effective Exchange Rate (as 2005 – the base 
year) Adjusted for Inflations 
 
World Bank 
Database 
Investor 
Protection Index 
The average of measurements on the extent 
of disclosure the extent of director liability 
index, and the ease of shareholder suits 
index. (0-10) 
 
Doing Business 
Cost of Imports Fee of 20-feet container of imported goods in 
USD 
 
Doing Business 
Paying Taxes Total Tax Rate as percentage of profit before 
all taxes. 
 
Doing Business 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
The total cost as the percentage of claim, 
including court costs, enforcement costs, and 
average attorney fees. 
 
Doing Business 
3.3 Final Datasets 
From these different sources described above, I finalize two data sets. The first 
one covers in total 332 industries subsectors (3-digit NAICS code) and 43 emerging 
market economies from the period 2002 to 2012.  The selection of 43 Emerging Market 
Economies14 follows Arbatli (2011). Each country in the list has experienced stably high 
growth rate and an impressive economic development for the last decade. The second one 
covers 10 industries (2-digit NAICS code) and 103 countries that trade with US MNEs 
over the same time period.                                                          
14 Please refer to the Appendix for the list of countries.  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Data Set 1 – Emerging Countries 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Import 
(Billion USD) 
0.585 3.970 0 160 
Related Parties Import 
(Billion USD) 
0.236 2.180 0 79 
IPR index 
(0-5) 
3.002469 1.253091 0 4.68 
Strength of Investor Protection Index 
(0-10) 
5.243151 1.455926 3 9 
Total Taxes 
(% of Profit) 
46.76896 17.18835 20 113 
Cost to Imports 
(Fee of a 20-foot container in USD) 
1168.242 593.0607 317 4865 
Enforcing Contract  
(% of the claim) 
28.6007 19.71832 10 139 
Log of Real Exchange Rate 7.63128 4.743214 1.238267 53.10346 
Log of GDP 11.43433 9.763538 -.6906835 29.23871 
Log of GDP per capita 10.35312 8.88558 -.6821083 29.6219 
IPR_Strength of Investor Protection 16.31875 8.168224 0 33.75 
 IPR_Enforcing Contract  90.32808 83.65046 0 550.44 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Data Set 2 – All Countries 
Variables 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Import  
(Billion USD) 
1.3200 8.0300 0 190 
IFT Import  
(Billion USD) 
0.7040 5.4300 0 144 
IPR Index 
(0-5) 
3.2640 0.8883 0 4.68 
Strength of Investor 
Protection Index (1-10) 
5.2336 1.6344 1 10 
Total Taxes 
 (% of Profit) 
47.7464 29.5793 14 280 
Cost of Imports  
(Fee of a 20-foot container in USD) 
1551.742 1077.0 317 9025 
Enforcing Contracts  
(Costs of Claims in USD) 
36.4336 27.2349 8 150 
Log of Real Exchange Rate 
7.037434 9.996286 -2.31009 735.0582 
Log of GDP 
24.6717 2.0803 19.8292 29.4160 
Log of GDP per capita 
8.3173 1.6952 4.6823 11.6265 
IPR_Strength of Investor Protection 
20.2029 11.8828 1.0600 49.9400 
IPR_Enforcing Contract 
98.6999 48.0947 1.3300 285.6600 
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 Table 3.1 and 3.2 show the descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables used in the regressions. In particular, it shows that the average of 
total imports from U.S.’s MNEs to EMs is 0.58 Billion USD for the time period 2002 to 
2012. Out of that, 0.23 Billion USD (almost 50%) is related-parties Imports. Compared to 
the dataset of all countries, the average total imports of all countries double that of EMs. 
Similarly, the mean of IFT imports to all countries  (0.7 Billion USD) are significantly 
higher than that of IFT imports to EMs (0.23 Billions USD). Thus, intra-firm trade from 
US’s MNEs is more often with trade partners from developed countries than emerging 
countries.  
 Another interesting observation is the IPR index. From the dataset of EMs, the 
IPR Index on average is surprisingly high, 3 on the scale 0-5. The average IPR of all 
countries is just a little bit higher; yet there is less variation in the index (with standard 
deviation of 0.88) than that of EMs Plotting the share of IFT of Manufacturing, Part 3 and 
IPR index in Figure 5 does not show any apparent correlation between IPR index and the 
share of intra-firm imports out of total imports. 
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Figure 5: Relationship between Share of IFT Imports of Computer Industry and 
IPR index 
 
3.4. Econometric Models 
 To assess the responsiveness of intra-firm imports to the global recession 2009, 
I regress the value and share of intra-firm imports on recession dummy and various time-
varying country characteristics variables. The final dataset includes the value imports by 
each 3-digit-NAICS industry sectors from US MNEs to each EMs over the time period 
2002-2012. I also extend my study by running the regression of the value of IFT imports 
and its share on the dataset of all countries, not only EMs. The regression model is:  
ITFcit = αi+ αc+ αt + β1Hct + β2REC + β3DOBUZ +β4IPRct + ε 
where: IFT is the Intra-firm Import with the subindex c for the country that hosts the 
foreign affiliates of MNEs, i for the industry index, and t for the time. α is the fixed 
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effects. H is the country characteristics, including GDP, GDP per capita, and the real 
exchange rate. DOBUZ is the Doing Business variables, including Strength of Investor 
Protection, Paying Taxes, Trading Across Border, and Enforcing Contracts. I expect to 
see an positive relationship between the value of IFT and Strength of Investor Protection 
while Paying Taxes and Trading Across Border are negatively linked to the value of IFT. 
The higher the Enforcing Contracts, the more likely MNEs will choose ALT instead of 
IFT. Thus, I expect to see a negative relationship between Enforcing Contracts and share 
of IFT out of total IFT.  REC is the binary variable for recession, taking the value 1 for 
recession years and 0 for the rest of the time period. IPR is the Intellectual Property Right 
index (0-5) constructed by Walker Park. 
The coefficient β2 of the Recession Dummy captures the increase/decrease of IFT 
imports in terms of value and share during the recession years. Similarly, the coefficient 
β4 illustrates how much IFT imports will change in response to each unit change in the 
IPR index. According to the literature, the higher the IPR index, the larger the levels of 
IFT and ALT.  
I also add the interaction terms of IPR with two Doing Business variables: 
Strength of Investor Protection Index and Enforcing Contracts Index as the impact of IPR 
on Intra-firm Imports also depends on the value of these two Doing Business variables.  
The coefficients of Interaction Terms take into account the effects of Enforcing 
Contracts/ Investor Protection on IFT imports to a country coupled with the country’s 
IPR index. The motivation to use the interaction term comes from the fact that the IPR 
index is mostly focused on the statutory aspects of the IPR protection and not on actual 
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enforcement. In a country with a strong Enforcing Contracts, an increase in IPR would 
have a larger impact of on IFT. Thus it is important to take into consideration of these 
interaction terms.  
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Chapter 4 |Regression Results 
This chapter presents the regression results for two datasets of Emerging Markets 
Economies and All Countries. The regression results on Table 4.1 and 4.2 are of the 
values of IFT imports from US’ MNEs to EMs for the time period 2002-2012 while 
Table 4.3 are results of the values of ALT imports to EMs. Correspondingly, Table 4.4, 
4.5, and 4.6 present the results of the All Countries dataset. I also include the result of 
natural log regression in which the dependent variables are the natural log of IFT and 
ALT in Table 4.5. Furthermore, because of a large number of missing values of the real 
exchange rate variable, observations drop significantly from the baseline regression to the 
other regressions. I run another set of regressions without controlling for the real 
exchange rate in order to cover a bigger portion of datasets and make it easier to compare 
among results of different regression models. Table 4.7 displays their results.  
4.1. Regression Results of Emerging Markets Economies (Table 4.1, 4.2, & 4.3) 
4.1.1. Responsiveness of IFT Imports (from US to EMs) to the global recession 
 In Table 4.1, the signs of recession dummy’s coefficients are negative, indicating 
that IFT imports decrease during recession years. While this results are expected, these 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Regressing the share of IFT imports shows   
more meaningful results of its responsiveness to the global recession. In table 4.2, the 
baseline regression model (Model 1) suggests that the share of IFT imports to EMs 
increases by 1.26% at the significance level of 5%. Adding time-varying countries 
characteristics: log of GDP, log of GDP per capita, and log of real exchange rate in 
Model 2 suggests that the share IFT imports out of total imports increases by 1.16% (at 
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the significant level of 10%) during recession year. Model 3 includes four Doing 
Business variables, and Model 4 adds the interaction terms of IPR and Investors 
Protection Index and Enforcing Contrast. In Model 5, I remove other Doing Business 
variables except Enforcing Contracts and the interaction terms between IPR and 
Enforcing Contracts. The coefficients in these models suggests similar patterns, however, 
they are not statistically significant.  
4.1.2. IPR Index and IFT Imports to EMs 
In table 4.1, the coefficients of IPR index in all regression models have positive 
signs, showing that the higher the IPR, the higher the value of IFT imports. The result is 
not surprising because a strong IPR protection is one of the important factors to boost 
foreign investments, leading to an increase in the value of IFT imports. In the baseline 
regression (Model 1), one unit increase in IPR index leads to an increase of 135 Million 
USD in IFT imports to EMs (at the significance level of 5%). Controlling for log of GDP, 
GDP per capita, and the Real Exchange Rate shows a more significant increase in IFT 
imports (367.4 Millions USD) corresponding to one-unit increase in IPR index (at the 
significance level of 1%). In Model 5 when we just include only Enforcing Contracts and 
its interaction terms with IPR, the coefficient of IPR index suggests even a higher 
increase in the value of IFT imports to EMs, 852 Million USD, at the significance level 
of 1%.  
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Table4.1: Dependent Variable: Value of IFT Imports To EMs (in Million USD) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Recession Dummy 
 
 
 
-11.8288 -32.230 -75.275 -70.352 -24.065 
(46548423.0) 
 
 
(71562419.7) 
 
 
(79551813.1) 
 
 
(80176166.9) 
 
 
(61365389.6) 
 
 
IPR index 
(0-5) 
 
 
135.011** 367.462*** 184.287 388.105 852.231*** 
(52963438.7) 
 
 
(120491229.2) 
 
 
(176298277.7) 
 
 
(703742085.5) 
 
 
(224147428.3) 
 
 
Log of GDP 
(in current USD) 
 
 
 
0.221 0.221 0.0993 -0.2066 
 
(3152633.8) 
 
 
(3849460.1) 
 
 
(3855666.5) 
 
 
(2689022.1) 
 
 
Log of Real Exchange Rate 
(2005 is baseline) 
 
 
 
2.925 3.740 3.355 2.319 
 
(3596149.7) 
 
 
(4585012.2) 
 
 
(4593733.4) 
 
 
(3036081.2) 
 
 
Log of GDP per capita 
(in current USD) 
 
 
-0.506 -0.656 -1.547 
 
 
(2489843.2) 
 
 
(4124776.9) 
 
 
(4170437.2) 
 
 
 Investors Protection 
(0-10) 
 
 
  
57.041 -126.264 
 
  
(67416971.6) 
 
 
(434969473.4) 
 
 
 Total Taxes 
(% of profit)  
 
 
  
-17.987* -14.449 
 
  
(10834300.6) 
 
 
(11272570.1) 
 
 
 
Cost of Import 
(Fee of a 20-foot container in USD) 
 
  
0.0198 0.0138 
 
  
(166354.0) 
 
 
(167740.6) 
 
 
 
Enforcing Contracts 
(% of claims) 
 
  
-24.85 37.478 57.189 
  
(35542524.4) 
 
 
(55991854.2) 
 
 
(37213345.1) 
 
 
IPR* Investor Protection 
 
 
 
   
58.916 
 
   
(136366788.2) 
 
 
 IPR*Enforcing Contracts 
 
 
 
   
-16.189 -20.458*** 
   
(11225626.1) 
 
 
(7152205.8) 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
-413.878** -1108.48** 982.364 -27.172 -2454.8*** 
(210142643.0) 
 
 
(475448965.4) 
 
 
(1.51676e+09) 
 
 
(2.62490e+09) 
 
 
(950658632.9) 
 
 
Obs 
 13551 8819 7230 7230 10624 
R2 
 0.161 0.174 0.177 0.177 0.162 
All regression models include fixed Effects for years, countries, and industries. Recession Dummy is equal to one for recession year 
2008 and 2009. IPR index (0-5) is from Walker Park dataset. Log of GDP and GDP per capita is US$ come from World Bank. Log of 
Real Exchange rate is calculated by using nominal effective exchange rate and inflation from World Bank measured for US and 
country c. Investors Protection Index (1-9), Cost of Import (USD), Enforcing Contracts (Costs of Claims in USD), Paying Taxes (% of 
total Profit) are from Doing Business Dataset of World Bank. In Model 4 and 5, we include the interaction terms of IPR and two 
Doing Business variables, Investors Protection Index and Enforcing Contracts. Standard Errors of variables are put in parentheses. 
***, **, and * show significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
37 
Table 4.2: Dependent Variable: Share of IFT Imports To EMs  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Recession Dummy 
 
 
 
0.0126** 0.0116* 0.00153 0.00224 0.00786 
(0.00509) 
 
 
(0.00648) 
 
 
(0.00682) 
 
 
(0.00688) 
 
 
(0.00616) 
 
 
IPR index 
(0-5) 
 
 
0.0230*** 0.0337*** 0.00146 -0.0538 0.0336 
(0.00568) 
 
 
(0.0108) 
 
 
(0.0149) 
 
 
(0.0592) 
 
 
(0.0220) 
 
 
Log of GDP 
(in current USD) 
 
 
 
-0.0000479 0.000110 0.0000943 0.000116 
 
(0.000284) 
 
 
(0.000329) 
 
 
(0.000330) 
 
 
(0.000269) 
 
 
Log of Real Exchange Rate 
(2005 is baseline) 
 
 
 
-0.000133 0.000179 0.000175 -0.0000191 
 
(0.000325) 
 
 
(0.000393) 
 
 
(0.000394) 
 
 
(0.000305) 
 
 
Log of GDP per capita 
(in current USD) 
 
 
0.0000984 0.000209 0.000220 
 
 
(0.000223) 
 
 
(0.000351) 
 
 
(0.000356) 
 
 
 Investors Protection 
(0-10) 
 
 
  
0.0113* -0.0191 
 
  
(0.00577) 
 
 
(0.0366) 
 
 
 Total Taxes 
(% of profit)  
 
 
  
-0.00132 -0.00121 
 
  
(0.000921) 
 
 
(0.000958) 
 
 
 
Cost of Import 
(Fee of a 20-foot container in USD) 
 
  
0.0000378*** 0.0000362** 
 
  
(0.0000142) 
 
 
(0.0000143) 
 
 
 
Enforcing Contracts 
(% of claims) 
 
  
0.00310 0.00194 0.00540 
  
(0.00306) 
 
 
(0.00474) 
 
 
(0.00369) 
 
 
IPR* Investor Protection 
 
 
 
   
0.00964 
 
   
(0.0115) 
 
 
 IPR*Enforcing Contracts 
 
 
 
   
0.000294 -0.0000430 
   
(0.000942) 
 
 
(0.000700) 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
0.0503** -0.00948 -0.0180 0.154 -0.109 
(0.0242) 
 
 
(0.0432) 
 
 
(0.130) 
 
 
(0.222) 
 
 
(0.0945) 
 
 
Obs 
 12805 8418 6902 6902 10034 
R2 
 0.282 0.304 0.314 0.314 0.287 
All regression models include fixed Effects for years, countries, and industries. Recession Dummy is equal to one for recession year 
2008 and 2009. IPR index (0-5) is from Walker Park dataset. Log of GDP and GDP per capita is US$ come from World Bank. Log of 
Real Exchange rate is calculated by using nominal effective exchange rate and inflation from World Bank measured for US and 
country c. Investors Protection Index (1-9), Cost of Import (USD), Enforcing Contracts (Costs of Claims in USD), Paying Taxes (% of 
total Profit) are from Doing Business Dataset of World Bank. In Model 4 and 5, we include the interaction terms of IPR and two 
Doing Business variables, Investors Protection Index and Enforcing Contracts. Standard Errors of variables are put in parentheses. 
***, **, and * show significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table 4.3: Dependent Variable: Value of ALT Imports To EMs (in Million USD)  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Recession Dummy 
 
 
 
-22.60 -47.33 -97.62 -92.97 -34.875 
(41.106) 
 
 
(68.45) 
 
 
(76.38) 
 
 
(76.516) 
 
 
(68.837) 
 
 
IPR index 
(0-5) 
 
 
328.327*** 614.55*** 311.36** 792.493* 1376*** 
(52.188) 
 
 
(91.26) 
 
 
(130.165) 
 
 
(438.45) 
 
 
(212.088) 
 
 
Log of GDP 
(in current USD) 
 
 
 
-0.54 -1.611 -0.947 -0.359 
 
(2.97) 
 
 
(3.64) 
 
 
(3.65) 
 
 
(2.975) 
 
 
Log of Real Exchange Rate 
(2005 is baseline) 
 
 
 
1.44 3.386 3.341 0.376 
 
(2.35) 
 
 
(3.94) 
 
 
(3.943) 
 
 
(2.38) 
 
 
Log of GDP per capita 
(in current USD) 
 
 
3.078 1.987 2.636 3.1857 
 
(3.371) 
 
 
(4.333) 
 
 
(4.344) 
 
 
(3.370) 
 
 
Investors Protection 
(0-10) 
 
 
  
66.3015 34.235 
 
  
(64.788) 
 
 
(239.779) 
 
 
 Total Taxes 
(% of profit)  
 
 
  
-30.733*** -26.385** 
 
  
(10.231) 
 
 
(10.487) 
 
 
 Cost of Import 
(Fee of a 20-foot container in 
USD) 
 
  
0.0130 0.0916 
 
  
(0.1603) 
 
 
(0.162) 
 
 
 
Enforcing Contracts 
(% of claims) 
 
  
-16.979 83.390 131.394*** 
  
(34.045) 
 
 
(59.544) 
 
 
(43.299) 
 
 
IPR* Investor Protection 
 
 
 
   
16.410 
 
   
(71.096) 
 
 
 IPR*Enforcing Contracts 
 
 
 
   
-26.708** -37.482*** 
   
(13.044) 
 
 
(9.416) 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
-792.927*** -1825.62*** 1162.4 -1144.45 
-
4442.20*** 
(196.440) 
 
 
(402.921) 
 
 
(1414.11) 
 
 
(2119.3) 
 
 
(1013.72) 
 
 
Obs 
 14583 8850 7230 7230 8850 
R2 
 0.266 0.275 0.286 0.287 0.276 
 
 All regression models include fixed Effects for years, countries, and industries. Recession Dummy is equal to one for recession year 
2008 and 2009. IPR index (0-5) is from Walker Park dataset. Log of GDP and GDP per capita is US$ come from World Bank. Log of 
Real Exchange rate is calculated by using nominal effective exchange rate and inflation from World Bank measured for US and 
country c. Investors Protection Index (1-9), Cost of Import (USD), Enforcing Contracts (Costs of Claims in USD), Paying Taxes (% of 
total Profit) are from Doing Business Dataset of World Bank. In Model 4 and 5, we include the interaction terms of IPR and two 
Doing Business variables, Investors Protection Index and Enforcing Contracts. Standard Errors of variables are put in parentheses. 
***, **, and * show significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Comparing between IFT and ALT, I found that IPR index has a more robust 
impact on the values of ALT imports to EMs. In Table 4.3 shows the result of regressing 
the values of ALT imports; all coefficients of IPR index are significant at 1% level in 
Model 1, 2, and 5, and 5% level at Model 3. Controlling for all countries, Doing Business 
variables, and interaction terms in Model 4, I found that one unit increase in IPR leads to 
792.5 Million USD increase in ALT imports to EMs (at the significant level of 10%).  
Considering the impact of IPR on both the values IFT and ALT imports, it is 
interesting to see the positive correlation between IPR index and share of IFT imports to 
EMs in Table 4.2. At the significance level of 1%, share of IFT imports will increase by 
3.3% in correspondence to 1 unit increase in IPR (in model 2). This result contradicts the 
literature discussed in Chapter 2. As discussed in the Literature Review section, the 
higher the IPR, the more likely MNEs will choose ALT over IFT as their technologies 
transfer to subcontractors are less likely to leak out to other parties. While the Model 4’s 
regression does not show statistically significant results, adding interaction terms 
between IPR and Investors Protection/Enforcing Contract changes the sign of IPR 
coefficient into negative.  
4.1.3. Doing Business Variables and Their Impacts on IFT Imports to EMs 
Most of these other Doing Business variables and the interaction terms are not 
statistically significant. In Table 4.1, the coefficients of Total Taxes shows a positive link 
to the value IFT imports with 1% increase in taxes percentage out of total profit leads to a 
decrease of IFT imports to EMs by 18 Million USD. In Table 4.2, Cost of Imports has a 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level. However as the unit measurement of 
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Cost of Imports variable is minimal (fee of 20-foot container in USD), its impact on the 
share of IFT imports is negligible. When only including Enforcing Contracts variable in 
Model 5, the coefficients suggest a positive relationship with IFT imports to EMs on both 
the level and the share measurement. It is opposite to the theoretical paper of Antras and 
Helpman on product contractibility and Intra-firm trade. However, it is arguable that the 
measurement of Enforcing Contracts as percentage of claims does not effectively reflect 
the definition of product contractibility that Antras and Helpman provided. The 
interaction terms between Enforcing Contracts and IPR in table 4.1 yields a negative 
coefficient at 1% significance level, indicating that each unit increase in the IPR index 
results in a flatter slope of regression line of Enforcing Contracts and values of IFT 
imports to EMs.  
The R2 indicates the goodness of fit of the predicted models. As more variables 
are added to the regression, observations decrease due to missing values of Real 
Exchange Rate and Doing Business variables. However, R2 in table 4.1 increases from 
16.1% in the baseline regression to around 17% for other models. This means that 
relatively little of the variation of IFT imports from US’s MNEs to EMs can be explained 
by recession dummies and other variables while controlling for countries, years, and 
industries. On table 4.2, regressing the share of IFT imports yields a higher R2, around 
30% after I add more independent variables to the baseline regression model.  
4.2: Regression Results of All Countries Dataset (Table 4.4, 4.5, & 4.6) 
 For the second dataset of all countries, the regressions of the value of IFT and 
ALT imports do not yield significant coefficients. However, regressing the share of IFT 
imports in Table 4.5, I found statistically significant coefficients of Recession Dummy, 
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Investors Protection, and Total Taxes variables. In terms of IFT imports’ responsiveness 
to the global recession, the baseline model of Table 4.4 shows that the share of IFT 
imports to all countries increase by 0.97 % at the significance level of 10%. Controlling 
for time-varying country characteristics first and then Doing Business variables, I found 
that the share of IFT imports increase by around 0.05%, however, all these coefficients 
are not statistically significant. It is important to note that all these coefficients of IFT 
imports to all countries are smaller than that of IFT imports to emerging economies 
(presented in Table 4.2). Thus, the result confirms that IFT imports to EMs are more 
resilient to the global recession than either IFT imports to all countries or ALT imports.  
The IPR index has a statistically significant and positive link to the share of IFT 
imports (Table 4.5). The baseline regression results suggest that share of IFT imports 
increase by 4.6% in response to one unit surge in IPR index at the 1% significance level. 
Controlling for country variables reduced the increase of share of IFT imports to 2.8%. In 
table 4.6, the results suggest a negative link between IPR index and the values of ALT 
imports (except the baseline regression). Again, the direction of the relationship is 
opposite to the expectation.   
Regarding the Doing Business variables in table 4.4, coefficients of Investor 
Protections and Total Taxes have positive sign while those of Costs of Imports and 
Enforcing Contracts are negative. However all these coefficients are not significant. 
Table 4.5: Regression of share of IFT imports shows a more meaningful result. The 
Investor Protection coefficient of model 3 suggests that one unit increase in Strength of 
Investor Protection index results in 2% decrease in the share of IFT imports at the 
significant level of 5%. The result is not surprising.  MNEs will be more likely to 
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subcontract with a non-related party in a foreign country whose protection for foreign 
investors is strong. The coefficient of Total Taxes suggests a minimal increase in share of 
IFT imports at the significant level of 5%. All other Doing Business variables have 
insignificant coefficients. At the 10% significance level, the coefficient of Investor 
Protection suggests that one unit increase in the Strength of Investor Protection Index 
results in a range of 2.7% - 5% decrease in share of IFT imports. The negative 
relationship is expected, as MNEs are more likely to choose subcontracting their 
production process in a foreign country when their investments and rights are 
safeguarded. Total Taxes have a positive relationship with the share of IFT imports as 
indicated in the Table 4.5. The R-square of regressions on the second dataset is around 
35-40%, thus regression models in this dataset explain more observations than the first 
one.   
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Table 4.4: The value of IFT Imports to All Countries (in Millions USD)  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Recession Dummy 
 
 
 
73.75 465.14 108.58 108.15 520.47 
(248) (480) (429) (433) (501) 
IPR index 
(0-5) 
 
 
-67.98 -65.04 -1.86 -15.83 -80.54 
(419.72) 
 
 
 
(567.49) 
 
 
 
(1,492.96) 
 
 
 
(461.71) 
 
 
 
(461.71) 
 
 
 
Log of GDP 
(in current USD) 
 
 
 
283.03 311.62 316.25 346.92 
 
(2,038) 
 
 
 
(3,036) 
 
 
 
(3,056) 
 
 
 
(2,134) 
 
 
 
Log of GDP per capita 
(in current USD) 
 
 
 
-722.52 -490.81 -496.30 -816.71 
 
(2,236) 
 
 
 
(3,311) 
 
 
 
(3,331) 
 
 
 
(2,329) 
 
 
 
Log of Real Exchange Rate 
(2005 is the base year) 
 
 
 
4.23 2.02 2.03 4.31 
 
(10.43) 
 
 
 
(14.64) 
 
 
 
(14.66) 
 
 
 
(10.70) 
 
 
 
Investors Protection 
(0-10) 
 
 
  
148.39 5.00 
 
  
(117.67) 
 
 
 
(404.68) 
 
 
 
 Total Taxes 
(% of profit)  
 
 
  
1.29 1.05 
 
  
(2.34) 
 
 
 
(2.43) 
 
 
 
 Cost of Import 
(Fee of a 20-foot container in 
USD) 
 
  
-0.02 -0.02 
 
  
(0.32) 
 
 
 
(0.32) 
 
 
 
 
Enforcing Contracts 
(USD) 
 
  
-0.50 -0.81 -0.09 
  
(14.11) 
 
 
(14.97) 
 
 
(13.27) 
 
 
IPR* Investor Protection 
 
 
 
   
44.91 
 
   
(121.25) 
 
 
 
 IPR*Enforcing Contracts 
 
 
 
   
-0.19 -0.18 
   
(2.34) 
 
 
 
(2.17) 
 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
541.96 -5426.37 -4457.84 -4946.33 -6036.43 
(413.97) 
 
 
(19787.70) 
 
 
(29713.70) 
 
 
(29768.90) 
 
 
(20783.60) 
 
 
Obs 10702.00 6786.00 5524.00 5524.00 6584.00 
R2 0.32 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 
All regression models include fixed Effects for years, countries, and industries. Recession Dummy is equal to one for recession year 2008 and 2009. IPR 
index (0-5) is from Walker Park dataset. Log of GDP and GDP per capita is US$ come from World Bank. Real Exchange rate is calculated by using 
nominal exchange rate from World Bank and price ratio from the Penn World Table. Investors Protection Index (1-9), Cost of Import (USD), Enforcing 
Contracts (Costs of Claims in USD), Paying Taxes (% of total Profit) are from Doing Business Dataset of World Bank. In Model 4 and 5, we include the 
interaction terms of IPR and two Doing Business variables, Investors Protection Index and Enforcing Contracts. Standard Errors of variables are put in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * show significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
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Table 4.5: Dependent Variable: The share of IFT Imports to All Countries 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Recession Dummy 
0.00967* 0.00597 0.0048 0.00547 0.0062 
(0.00537) (0.00692) (0.00710) (0.00711) (0.00693)  
 
 
IPR index 0.0468*** 0.0279** 0.0232 -0.0582 0.0238 
(0-5) (0.00842) (0.0167) (0.0213) (0.0605) (0.0179)  
 
 
Log of GDP 
 
0.149*** 0.194** 0.222*** 0.146**  
(in current USD) 
 
(0.0782) (0.109) (0.110) (0.0799)  
 
 
Log of GDP per capita 
 
 
 
-0.275*** 
 
 
-0.334*** 
 
 
-0.347*** 
 
 
-0.275*** 
(in current USD) 
 
(0.0890) (0.125) (0.126) (0.0907) 
 
 
Log of Real Exchange Rate 
 
 
 
-0.000243 
 
 
-0.000551 
 
 
-0.000499 
 
 
-0.000230  
(2005 is base year) 
 
(0.000383) (0.000549) (0.000550) (0.000384)  
Investors Protection 
(0-10)   
 
 
-0.0156* 
 
 
-0.0528*  
 
  
(0.00824) (0.0290) 
 
Total Taxes 
(% of profit)    
0.0004640** 0.000386** 
 
  
(0.000176) (0.000180)  
 
Cost of Import 
(Fee of a 20-foot container 
in USD)   
0.0000375* 0.0000367 
 
  
(0.0000224) (0.0000224) 
 
Enforcing Contracts 
(USD)   
-0.000101 0.000305 -0.000310 
  
(0.00107) (0.00112) (0.00100) 
IPR* Investor Protection 
    
0.0114 
 
   
(0.00868) 
 
IPR*Enforcing Contracts 
    
0.000188 0.000165 
   
(0.000166) (0.000157) 
Constant 
 
 
-0.0602* 
 
-5.104*** 
 
-6.118*** 
 
 
-6.036*** 
 
 
-5.098*** 
(0.0317) (1.284) (1.799) (1.806) (1.314)  
Obs 9664 6252 5059 5059 6072 
R2 
 
0.352 
 
0.380 
 
0.390 
 
0.390 
 
0.387 
All regression models include fixed Effects for years, countries, and industries. Recession Dummy is equal to one for recession year 
2008 and 2009. IPR index (0-5) is from Walker Park dataset. Log of GDP and GDP per capita is US$ come from World Bank. Log of 
Real Exchange rate is calculated by using nominal effective exchange rate and inflation from World Bank measured for US and 
country c. Investors Protection Index (1-9), Cost of Import (USD), Enforcing Contracts (Costs of Claims in USD), Paying Taxes (% of 
total Profit) are from Doing Business Dataset of World Bank. In Model 4 and 5, we include the interaction terms of IPR and two 
Doing Business variables, Investors Protection Index and Enforcing Contracts. Standard Errors of variables are put in parentheses. 
***, **, and * show significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table 4.6: Value of ALT Imports to All Countries (in Million USD)  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Recession Dummy 
 
 
 
5.981 -34.382 -37.917 -38.912 -35.861 
(61817526.0) 
 
 
 
(93672991.0) 
 
 
 
(93993513.0) 
 
 
 
(94029627.1) 
 
 
 
(93741582.8) 
 
 
 
IPR index 
(0-5) 
 
 
195.459** -46.935 -14.581 -89.030 -118.669 
(97261058.7) 
 
 
 
(225484377.0) 
 
 
 
(226813709.5) 
 
 
 
(289126606.4) 
 
 
 
(283780669.2) 
 
 
 
Log of GDP 
(in current USD) 
 
 
 
208.804 166.215 293.065 229.055 
 
(1.04374e+09) 
 
 
 
(1.05232e+09) 
 
 
 
(1.07430e+09) 
 
 
 
(1.04513e+09) 
 
 
 
Log of Real Exchange Rate 
(2005 is baseline) 
 
 
 
-4.789 -2.227 -2.611 -5.374 
 
(5156723.7) 
 
 
 
(5533399.2) 
 
 
 
(5573595.6) 
 
 
 
(5230265.6) 
 
 
 
Log of GDP per capita 
(in current USD) 
 
 
182.184 -11.045 -133.997 179.291 
 
(1.19091e+09) 
 
 
(1.20466e+09) 
 
 
(1.22470e+09) 
 
 
(1.19157e+09) 
 
 
Investors Protection 
(0-10) 
 
 
  
38.178 -0.2564 
 
  
(34005982.9) 
 
 
 
(72187085.6) 
 
 
 
 Total Taxes 
(% of profit)  
 
 
  
0.2918 0.5538 
 
  
(3468184.9) 
 
 
 
(3491690.2) 
 
 
 
 Cost of Import 
(Fee of a 20-foot container in 
USD) 
 
  
-0.173 -0.147 
 
  
(328705.6) 
 
 
 
(331534.1) 
 
 
 
 
Enforcing Contracts 
(% of claims) 
 
  
-3.744 -8.114 -11.266 
  
(5468941.5) 
 
 
(19733687.1) 
 
 
(19504554.4) 
 
 
IPR* Investor Protection 
 
 
 
   
9.427 
 
   
(16079732.7) 
 
 
 
 IPR*Enforcing Contracts 
 
 
 
   
1.386 2.596 
   
(5790121.0) 
 
 
 
(5714558.2) 
 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
-140.896 -5889 -3719 -5643 -6022 
(362454864.0) 
 
 
 
(1.71088e+10) 
 
 
 
(1.73107e+10) 
 
 
 
(1.76669e+10) 
 
 
 
(1.71482e+10) 
 
 
 
Obs 10702 6786 6786 6786 6786 
R2 0.376 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393 
All regression models include fixed Effects for years, countries, and industries. Recession Dummy is equal to one for recession year 2008 and 2009. IPR 
index (0-5) is from Walker Park dataset. Log of GDP and GDP per capita is US$ come from World Bank. Real Exchange rate is calculated by using 
nominal exchange rate from World Bank and price ratio from the Penn World Table. Investors Protection Index (1-9), Cost of Import (USD), Enforcing 
Contracts (Costs of Claims in USD), Paying Taxes (% of total Profit) are from Doing Business Dataset of World Bank. In Model 4 and 5, we include the 
interaction terms of IPR and two Doing Business variables, Investors Protection Index and Enforcing Contracts. Standard Errors of variables are put in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * show significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Chapter 5|Conclusion 
 
As the flow of MNE’s investment in emerging countries (EMs) keeps rising, it is 
important to learn more about the trade patterns to these countries and the country 
characteristics of doing business that play an important role. The choice of entry mode 
made by MNEs also account for a big difference in the effectiveness of foreign 
investment in an EM. Some developing countries promote joint ventures and licensing 
(Arm’s Length Trade) through their trade policies with the aim of maximizing technology 
transfer. However, compared to ALT, intra-firm trade (IFT) is more beneficial to the 
development as IFT can lead to an significant improvement on infrastructure and better 
training of the labor force hired by foreign investors. Even though the technology 
spillover is not apparent, these investments in labor skills and infrastructure via IFT have 
a significant impact on the economic growth in the long run. As a result, understanding 
more about IFT can assist implementing more efficient trade policies. It also helps 
preventing protectionism which stems out of fear that allowing multinational enterprises 
to establish wholly owned subsidiaries may prevent domestic companies to compete or 
break into some industries.  
The primary purpose of the study is to assess the responsiveness of IFT from US’ 
MNEs to EMs during the recession year using fixed effects of countries, industries, and 
times. The second purpose is to assess the impact of IPR and some Doing Business 
variables on IFT imports. To do that, I work with two data sets, one covers 43 Emerging 
Markets Economies and the others All Countries that US has trade relationship with. The 
major contributions of my study are three-fold. First, the share of IFT imports out of total 
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Imports increase during recession years while its values decrease as expected. The result 
confirms that IFT is more resilient than ALT in response to the Global Recession. The 
magnitude of increase in share of IFT imports during recession years to exclusively 
emerging countries (1.2%) is higher than that of IFT to all countries (0.9%).  Second, IPR 
is positively linked to IFT imports to emerging countries on both the value and share 
level. The results contradict previous studies that the higher the IPR index, the more 
likely MNEs choose ALT instead of IFT. It is also important to note that the coefficient 
of IPR index is statistically significant only in regressions of share of IFT imports. This 
shows that a strong intellectual property protection in an emerging country is not 
compelling enough for MNEs to choose ALT instead of IFT. In other words, to promote 
ALT from MNEs in order for higher level of technology spillover to occur, EMs have to 
improve all aspects of their business environments, not just IPR index. Third, most of 
Doing Business variables are not significant. In case of statistically meaningful result, the 
coefficients are very small, suggesting minimal impact on IFT imports.  
Despite these contributions, there are some limitations of the study to address. 
First, the dataset of US Census Bureau on Related Parties Trade provides a broad cover 
of trade values from all countries and industries. However, the strict definition of intra-
firm trade is slightly different than related-parties trade in terms of percentage of 
ownership and relationships between foreign affiliates and headquarters. It is because of 
the scarcity of disaggregated data on the firm-transaction level. Second, Enforcing 
Contract variable does not to reflect the definition of the Product Contractibility 
according to Antras and Helpman (2009). The Doing Business website vaguely describes 
the Enforcing Contract’s measurement as percentage of claims while Product 
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Contractibility’s definition refers to be more specific to the nature of products. Some 
studies have attempted to measure the level of Product Contractibility based on the Input-
Output Matrix Table and other sources that I do not have access to.  
In summary, the study indicates some interesting patterns of Intra-firm trade to 
Emerging Markets and their responses to macroeconomic shocks and other country-level 
determinants.  Hopefully, it will sparks more interest on the matter, leading to more 
investigation and analysis of a higher disaggregated dataset.  
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Appendix 
1. List of Emerging Market Economies:  Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,  El Salvador, Estonia,  Guatem ala, Hungary, India,  Indonesia, Israel,  Jam aica, Jord n, Kazakhstan,  Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania,  Russian, Slovak, South Africa, Sri Lanka,  Thailand, Tunisia,  Turkey.  
 
2. Top Ten Intra-firm Trade Partners with the US  
(Source: US Census Bureau) 
Top Ten IFT-
Imports Countries  
Total Imports 
(in value) 
% of Total 
Imports 
IFT imports 
(in value) 
Share of IFT 
Imports 
Canada 316396.5 14.46747 162045.3 51.21589 
Mexico 262671 12.01083 155712.5 59.28045 
China 398466.8 18.2202 111598.7 28.00702 
Japan 127901.2 5.848377 97788.93 76.45664 
Germany 96539.24 4.41433 65755.65 68.11287 
Ireland 39071.8 1.786588 34592.57 88.53592 
Saudi Arabia 45129.62 2.063586 33850.27 75.00678 
Korea, South 56006.03 2.560918 33724.82 60.21642 
United Kingdom 51044.82 2.334063 28154.45 55.15634 
France 
 39596.21 1.810567 20559.13 51.92197 
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Top Ten IFT -
Exports Countries  
Total Export 
(in values) 
%  of Total 
Export 
IFT exports 
(in value) 
Share of IFT 
Exports 
Canada 233,774 15.8 98,098 42.0 
Mexico 159,910 10.8 60,515 37.8 
Japan 61,409 4.1 18,673 30.4 
Netherlands 38,254 2.6 17,088 44.7 
China 96,898 6.5 15,325 15.8 
Germany 44,240 3.0 15,187 34.3 
United Kingdom 
 49,984 3.4 13,657 27.3 
Singapore 
 28,224 1.9 12,290 43.5 
Belgium 
 25,881 1.7 11,390 44.0 
Brazil 
 37,275 2.5 9,170 24.6 
 
 
3. Calculation of Natural Log of Real Exchange Rate 
The natural log of real exchange rate (ec) is calculated from the log of effective 
exchange rate  (Ec ) adjusted for inflation of US and country c. As the real exchange rate 
of a foreign currency in terms of US dollars is: ec = Ec*Pc/Pus 
By taking the natural log for two sides of the equations, we can derive the natural 
log of real exchange rate as: Log ec = Log Ec + Πc –Πus. 
 
